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Abstract
Brain injury contributes more to death and disability globally than any other traumatic incident. While
the past decade has seen significant medical advances, laws and policies remain stumbling blocks to
treatment and care. The quality of life of persons with severe brain injury often declines with unnecessary
institutionalization and inadequate access to rehabilitation and assistive technologies. This raises a host
of rights violations that are hidden, given that persons with severe brain injury are generally invisible
and marginalized. This article highlights the current neglect and experiences of persons with severe
brain injury in the United States, analyzing the rights to life, health, benefit from scientific progress,
education, freedom of expression, community, family, and equality.
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Introduction
Brain injury contributes more to death and disability globally than any other traumatic incident.
Each year, there are approximately 69 million
reported cases worldwide, but numbers may be
even higher due to severe under-reporting.2 In the
United States, brain injury is the leading cause of
death and disability among young people.3 In fact,
researchers refer to traumatic brain injury as a "silent epidemic."4
While medical and scientific advances mean
that the lives of persons who sustain severe brain injuries can be saved, quality of life post-injury often
decline because of unnecessary institutionalization
in long-term care facilities and a subsequent lack of
access to rehabilitation and technologies that can
assist with the injured person's communication and
community reintegration. Although severe brain
injury seems to be solely a medical problem, many
of the barriers to quality care post-injury are rights
violations and can be addressed through law and
policy interventions.,
Indeed, the care and treatment of persons with
severe brain injury raises questions of fundamental
rights and human dignity. Current medical practice all too often results in violations of the rights
to life, health, benefit from scientific progress, education, freedom of expression, community, family,
and equality. However, violations of the rights of
persons with severe brain injury are often hidden
since such persons are not in a position to advocate
for themselves, and their family members may be
burdened by grief and the demands of care.6 Even
within the disability community, the issues affecting persons with severe brain injury are largely
invisible and marginalized.
This article provides an international human
rights analysis of the experiences of persons with
severe brain injury, highlighting their neglected
rights. With severe brain injury being an overlooked topic in the human rights field, this article
seeks to contribute to scholarship and advocacy
in this area by providing a conceptual framework
of key rights at stake through an interdisciplinary
analysis of law, neuroscience, and clinical practice.
While this article focuses on the United States,
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brain injury is a global concern, and this analysis is
relevant to many other countries. The first section
describes severe brain injury, outlines available
medical treatments, and discusses clinical, legal,
and policy barriers to care. The second section
analyzes the experiences of persons with severe
brain injury against the guarantees of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
(CRPD), which sets the global standard regarding
the rights of persons with disabilities, as well as the
International Bill of Human Rights, consisting of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).7 Finally,
the third section provides recommendations to advance the rights of persons with severe brain injury
and address current gaps in treatment and care.

Severe brain injury and available
treatments
Thanks to advances in medical knowledge, persons
who in the recent past would have died because
of severe brain injuries now often survive, many
with differing degrees of disability, including
disorders of consciousness (DOCs). Scientific
knowledge of DOCs has evolved over the decades,
and recent years have seen the development of an
evidence-based practice, as well as updated terminology and standards of care published in 2018.8
Yet much remains to be done. To date, there is no
comprehensive epidemiology of patients with these
conditions; instead, the prevalence is estimated to
be several hundred thousand people in the United States, although these data are likely flawed
methodologically.9
DOCs include the vegetative state and minimally conscious state (MCS). The vegetative state is
"a condition of wakeful unconsciousness" in which
a patient's eyes maybe open but there is no evidence

of consciousness.o The MCS, first defined in

2002,

is "a condition of severely altered consciousness
characterized by minimal but definite behavioral
evidence of self or environmental awareness."" A
person enters the MCS after being in a coma or veg-
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etative state, and manifestations of consciousness
are inconsistent."
Scientific research has demonstrated that
brain states are not static; rather, they evolve over
time.13 Indeed, with existing technology and medical knowledge, and with proper diagnosis and
appropriate medical interventions, improvement
and recovery are possible for persons with DOCs.
Presently, two-thirds of persons with a severe
brain injury regain consciousness, and just over
a fifth of persons in the MCS regain functional
independence when they receive the standard of rehabilitative care.14 As the state of science advances,
there is hope for persons with DOCs who have not
yet regained functional independence.
There are some promising investigational
neurotechnologies in development that may assist
a person with a DOC in regaining consciousness
and some abilities. For example, a randomized
clinical trial has shown that some drugs, such as
amantadine, when administered to persons with
DOC accelerate the recovery of consciousness.,,
Prescribing amantadine off-label to accelerate the
recovery of consciousness is now the standard of
care for persons with DOCs in rehabilitation.,'
Additionally, neuromodulation is another investigational avenue being explored. This includes deep
brain stimulation, vagal nerve stimulation, transcranial magnetic stimulation, hyperbaric therapy,
and directed ultrasound. 7
Despite this promise, most persons with a
DOC do not have access to necessary rehabilitation, much less basic medical care. Many die of
preventable illnesses such as bedsores, urinary
tract infections, and pneumonia.,' Equally critically, many are denied an accurate diagnosis.
Researchers have found that over 40% of persons in
the MCS in chronic care following traumatic brain
injury are misdiagnosed as being in the vegetative
state.1 9 When improperly diagnosed as vegetative,
persons fail to receive appropriate medical care and
rehabilitation, and are instead housed in long-term
care facilities.o And tragically, when patients are
thought vegetative and insensate, they may also be
denied pain medication.2
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Barriers to treatment as human rights
violations
Some of the issues that persons with severe brain
injury and subsequent DOCs face post-injury have
medical and technological solutions. If inaccurate
diagnosis is because clinicians are unaware of the
existence of the MCS, how to properly diagnose
it, or that amantadine should be administered to
try to induce consciousness, then the solution is
better education and clinical training. Additionally, misdiagnosis may be because the person with
severe brain injury is "covertly" conscious, unable
to physically indicate their consciousness.2 In this
case, the solution is access to skilled clinicians
trained to administer a neuropsychological exam
known as the "coma recovery scale-revised," which
is the most effective way to evaluate the presence of
the MCS.23
What is less obvious, but perhaps more consequential, is how law and policies can negatively affect
the lives of persons with severe brain injury. In the
United States, for example, persons with DOCs may
not be able to afford necessary rehabilitation because
health insurance may not reimburse patients for
the required length of rehabilitation.24 In contrast
to other wealthy countries, the United States lacks
an affirmative right to health care.2 5 Regulatory
policies governing drugs and devices may also cause
delays in getting effective treatments from bench
to bedside. Additionally, laws that protect persons
with disabilities from discrimination and mandate
accommodations, although applicable to persons
with DOC, may not be applied or enforced.2 Indeed,
recent empirical scholarship has shown that physicians are often ignorant of their affirmative duties to
accommodate their patients with disabilities when
providing health care.2 Furthermore, when persons
with brain injury assert their legal rights under federal disability law, even when they have legal victories,
there are few resulting changes in practice.29 Finally,
specific groups of persons with brain injuries may
also be neglected o For example, while legislators
have taken action to help veterans with traumatic
brain injuries gain access to necessary health care,
administrative agencies have not followed through
3
to ensure this access?
Thus, legal intervention is also
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required to improve the lives of persons with DOCs.
Clinical care, laws, and policies all need to be
improved to ensure that persons with severe brain
injury and subsequent DOCs are not neglected, but
instead have access to appropriate medical care and
thus have the opportunity to regain consciousness
and be reintegrated into their communities." The
basic human dignity of persons with severe brain
injury, as well as their legal entitlement to appropriate treatment and care, needs to be recognized.
The concepts of equality and dignity are at
the heart of human rights. Indeed, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights establishes the "inherent dignity" of every person as "the foundation
of freedom, justice and peace in the world."33 Similarly, the preambles of various international human
rights treaties identify dignity as the basis for other
rights.34 The CRPD, adopted in 2006, takes a significant step in affirming the dignity of persons with
disabilities and their standing within the human
community, asserting that "discrimination against
any person on the basis of disability is a violation
of the inherent dignity and worth of the human
person."35
These principles and affirmations must be applied to persons with severe brain injury so that this
population is no longer invisible, marginalized, or
disregarded. Appropriate treatment and rehabilitation for persons with severe brain injury is not just a
scientific or medical issue but a matter of respect for
fundamental human dignity.3 6 Framing the current
subpar treatment of persons with DOCs in terms
of human rights violations may provide an ethical
and legal catalyst for change. This remainder of this
section discusses the human rights implications for
persons with DOCs.

Right to life with dignity
In some cases, health care providers may view continued medical treatment for persons with DOCs
as futile. But such a lack of support for a family's
desire to continue care may infringe on the right
to life when patients have the potential to benefit
from medical advancements 3 As both the ICCPR
and CRPD recognize, "Every human being has the
inherent right to life."38 The CRPD further calls on
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states to "take all necessary measures to ensure its
effective enjoyment by persons with disabilities on
an equal basis."39
A family's desire for ongoing treatment of a
person with a DOC after a severe brain injury is
often out of sync with a health care system that
typically recommends that care be withheld or
withdrawn upon the loss of consciousness after an
injury or illness or wrongly analogizes the loss of
consciousness occurring with severe brain injury
to a terminal illness.4 There is a negative bias within society and among health care providers against
persons with DOCs since, in many cases, the loss
of consciousness reflects the last stage of a long,
drawn-out illness.41 For example, in Alzheimer's
disease, terminal cancer, and late-stage congestive
heart failure, the loss of consciousness often signals
the final stage of the disease.42 However, brain injury
is generally accompanied by unconsciousness at the
outset, which could be the first step toward recovery.43 Therefore, to equate the loss of consciousness
from brain injury with the loss of consciousness
from a degenerative or progressive disease is a
flawed analogy since these illnesses have distinct
trajectories.
A life with disability, even with severe brain
injury, can still have great value to the person, as
well as others. As the mother of a woman with severe brain injury explained, "Heather is going to be
different, but I don't think that doesn't mean she
won't be a wonderful daughter, friend, sister, and
we won't enjoy her for the rest of her life.""4 The
right to life for such persons requires respect.

Right to health
Current inadequate treatment and care of persons
with severe brain injury and DOCs also violates
their right to health. As set out in the ICESCR,
everyone has the right "to the enjoyment of the
highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health."45 The CRPD further clarifies that "persons
with disabilities have the right to the enjoyment of
the highest standard of health without discrimination on the basis of disability."46 As the United
Nations (UN) Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights has explained, the right to the
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highest attainable standard of health entails quality
health services that are available, acceptable, and
accessible "to all, especially the most vulnerable or
marginalized sections of the population."47
All too often, however, persons with severe
brain injury receive brilliant and life-saving emergency care only to be abandoned by the health care
system as they transition to the chronic care sector.
Because the prevailing medical and cultural view is
that the injured brain cannot recover and regain lost
functionality, resources for care thus fall off after
acute survival is assured, and the marginalization
of persons with a DOC begins.48 This marginalization and neglect include premature discharge,
warehousing in inadequate facilities, misdiagnosis,
and denial of rehabilitation.49
Patients with severe brain injury and subsequent DOCs are often discharged from the
hospital while still unstable and transferred to
long-term care facilities that are unequipped to
provide appropriate care for this patient population, particularly patients in the MCS who require
therapeutic engagement. 0 Further, as discussed
previously, studies show that the diagnostic error
rate of patients with DOCs in nursing homes is
over 40%, in part because nursing homes often fail
to recognize improvement in MCS patients.' These
patients are wrongfully diagnosed as vegetative
when they are, in fact, in the MCS.51
This misdiagnosis is often because before a
patient shows overt behavioral improvements that
evidence consciousness, the brain demonstrates
structural changes.53 Despite a bedside evaluation
that may not show evidence of consciousness, neuroimaging may show network activation in MCS
patients consistent with the ability to sustain emotion, thought, and language; progress in patients
with severe brain injury may not be observable given that recovery from these injuries is particularly
long and variable.54 Measuring progress solely by
motor function thus discriminates against patients
who cannot yet move or speak. Patients may remain
misdiagnosed for years while families struggle to
obtain an accurate diagnosis. The CRPD, however,
requires "early identification and intervention as

JUNE 2020

VOLUME 22

appropriate."55 Doing so is difficult, however, not
only because these patients are often in long-term
care facilities rather than hospitals or rehabilitative
facilities where they would have neuropsychiatric
health care specialists and neuroimaging equipment, but also because there is still a substantial
lack of information regarding DOC prognosis,
resulting from a gap in studies on patient rehabilitation and recovery.5 6
Moreover, despite the CRPD-enshrined right
to "comprehensive habilitation and rehabilitation
services and programmes," the denial of rehabilitation is a common problem for persons with severe
brain injury and DOCs worldwide.57 According to a
2011 report by the World Health Organization, 42%
of countries surveyed adopted no rehabilitation
policies, 50% had passed no rehabilitation legislation for people with disabilities, and 40% had not
adequately established rehabilitation programs.58
In the United States, the way that Medicare local
coverage determination decisions are made may
result in denying approval for rehabilitation for
persons with DOCs, and private health insurance
may differ on the scope and extent of rehabilitation
coverage. 59 In sum, although the CRPD specifically
"prohibit[s] discrimination against persons with
disabilities in the provision of health insurance"
and the "discriminatory denial of health care or
health services," and the US Affordable Care Act
also contains a non-discrimination section, in
practice, many patients with DOCs experience discrimination in health care coverage and delivery.o

Right to benefit from scientific progress
Persons with severe brain injury are not adequately
benefitting from scientific advances. The ICESCR
recognizes the right of everyone "[t]o enjoy the
benefits of scientific progress and its applications.",
The CRPD elaborates on states' obligation "to
undertake or promote research and development
of, and to promote the availability and use of new
technologies, including information and communication technologies, mobility aids, devices
and assistive technologies."- Moreover, it requires
states to "promote the availability, knowledge and
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use of assistive devices and technologies, designed
for persons with disabilities, as they relate to habilitation and rehabilitation."3
Persons with severe brain injury have a right
to benefit from scientific progress, including
medications, rehabilitation, and neuroprosthetic technologies that may restore their ability to
communicate and connect with others. Neuroprosthetics-devices that doctors implant into
a patient's brain or onto their head in order to
"supplement the input or output of the nervous system"-include artificial retinas, cochlear implants,
and surface electromyography electrodes. Neuroprosthetics can help patients regain the ability to
see and hear and re-enable the use of paralyzed
limbs, and thus can be beneficial to persons with
severe brain injury who acquire such disabilities. 64
Indeed, assistive technologies are critical to
the realization of a human rights of persons with
severe brain injury. As the UN Special Rapporteur
on the rights of persons with disabilities explains,
for many persons with disabilities, access to assistive technologies and support services "constitutes
a precondition for the respect of their inherent dignity and the full and equal enjoyment of all human
rights and fundamental freedoms."5 Such access is
also recognized as essential to the non-discriminatory treatment of persons with disabilities under
the Americans with Disabilities Act, the United
States' federal disability law.66
However, thus far, scientific developments
have had little impact on the experiences of patients
with DOCs who lack access to necessary medication, rehabilitation, and neuroprosthetics. 6 7 This
may be because in the United States, health care
providers and insurers do not recognize their legal
obligation under the Americans with Disabilities
Act to provide existing technology and medical
interventions to accommodate patients with severe
brain injury in order to help them communicate
with their providers to the extent they are able.68
Further, promising neurotechnologies may never
make it to the market, because of both research-related and regulatory hurdles 69
Indeed, we have yet to take even the first step
of collecting epidemiological data and conducting
270

JUNE 2020

VOLUME

22

NUMBER 1

H

studies necessary to develop assistive technologies
and guide policy, a requirement under international law.70 Under the CRPD, states must "undertake
to collect appropriate information, including statistical and research data, to enable them to formulate
and implement policies" to protect basic rights.i
The Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons
with disabilities likewise emphasizes the importance of data collection 7 Simply put: without a
count, you don't count.

Right to education
Persons with severe brain injury are often deprived
of necessary rehabilitation and thus the ability to
develop their full potential, which implicates the
human right to education. The ICESCR enshrines
"the right of everyone to education" for the "full
development of the human personality and the
sense of its dignity."73 The CRPD mandates "an
inclusive education system at all levels and lifelong
learning" to enable "development by persons with
disabilities of their personality, talents and creativity, as well as their mental and physical abilities, to
their fullest potential."74 The United States provides
free public schooling for children through the age
of majority in recognition of the importance of
minimum education. And with regard to children
with disabilities, the United States requires "a free
[and] appropriate public education that emphasizes
special education and related services designed
to meet their unique needs and prepare them for
further education, employment, and independent
living."75 Thus, both international and US domestic
law recognize the need for appropriate education
for people to reach their full potential.
The purpose of rehabilitation can be considered similar in key respects to the purpose of
education, critical to the development of persons
with severe brain injury. As noted previously, most
MCS patients lack access to rehabilitative technologies and "remain sequestered in nursing homes,
incompletely diagnosed ... at the margins of society."7 6 According to emerging scientific evidence,
the brain regenerates through axonal growth, just
as it does in its initial development.77 It may thus
make sense to view brain injury recovery through
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a developmental frame and to view rehabilitation
as analogous to education.78 Accordingly, persons
with severe brain injury should have access to rehabilitation, which, like education, functions to help
them reach their full potential-79
However, the amount of rehabilitation currently provided to patients with brain injury is
meager.'o Post-acute rehabilitation needs to be
of sufficient scope, duration, and intensity for injured persons to regain lost skills and learn new
compensatory strategies. Additionally, as with the
education of children, this process takes months
and years rather than weeks.

Right to freedom of expression
Persons with severe brain injury may not have
access to tools to assist them with communication.
Communicating wishes is an important element of
autonomy and self-determination fundamental to
personhood and human rights. Communication
is also a component of the right to freedom of
expression. Freedom of expression is recognized
by the ICCPR and includes the "freedom to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas of all
kinds."1 And under the CRPD, states must "take all
appropriate measures to ensure that persons with
disabilities can exercise the right to freedom of
expression and opinion."2 Freedom of expression
also ties into the first guiding principle set out by
the CRPD: "[r]espect for the inherent dignity, individual autonomy, including the freedom to make
one's own choices, and independence of persons."',
For persons with severe brain injury, like all
persons, the ability to communicate is critical. As
one of this paper's authors has previously asserted,
"If they cannot communicate, we do not know they
exist."4 Communication for many persons with
severe brain injury is now possible through the use
of assistive devices." These devices may enable such
persons to express their preferences and connect
with others. When, as all too often occurs, persons
with severe brain injury are not given the tools to
communicate, they are denied the right to freedom
of expression.8 6
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Right to community
The ability to communicate is not only critical to
freedom of expression but also essential to forming
relationships and being part of a community, which
many persons with severe brain injury and DOCs
are denied.8 The CRPD recognizes the "equal right
of all persons with disabilities to life in the community."" States must take measures to ensure their
"full inclusion and participation in the community" and "to prevent isolation or segregation." 89
Community is not only a physical place; rather, it can also be created through communication
and relationships with others. Restoring communication for persons with severe brain injury
enables their reintegration into family and society,
while failure to diagnose and sustain consciousness
relegates such persons to continued exile.90 As the
mother of one patient with brain injury explained,
"But if she can't communicate, then there is no way
for her to share the life of the mind with everyone
else."91 When MCS patients are enabled to communicate, their community can be rebuilt.
Additionally, persons with severe brain injury should have access to a community of peers.
Housing young patients with severe brain injury in
nursing homes serving older persons with degenerative disease segregates them from their peers
and deprives them of opportunities. Rather, these
young patients should be cared for in facilities with
patients of their generation, where the focus is not
on support during decline but on facilitating rehabilitation and progress.

Right to family
Having a family is a fundamental human right,
including for persons with disabilities such as severe brain injury. The ICCPR sets out the "right of
men and women of marriageable age to marry and
found a family," echoed by the CRPD, and the ICESCR requires the "widest possible protection and
assistance ... to the family, which is the natural and
fundamental group unit of society."92 The CRPD
exhorts states to "take effective and appropriate
measures to eliminate discrimination against
persons with disabilities in all matters relating to

NUMBER

1

271

T. EZER, M. S. WRIGHT, AND J. J. FINS / GENERAL PAPERS, 265-278

marriage, family, parenthood, and relationships."93
The UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities has further criticized the denial of legal
capacity with no provision for support in decision-making as leading to the deprivation "of many
fundamental rights," including the right to marry
and found a family and parental rights.94
The current financing mechanisms of the US
health care system, however, do not protect the family relations of persons with significant disabilities
but rather contribute to tearing them apart. In couples where one partner suffers from brain injury, for
which the costs of care can be financially ruinous,
partners may be forced into a "Medicaid divorce" to
qualify for public health insurance while protecting
family assets. As one spouse lamented, "This country doesn't allow a catastrophe like this to take care
of someone without wiping out a family."95 Health
care regulations in the United States compound
medical tragedies, severing relationships. After
the divorce, the former caretaking spouse may no
longer be legally entrusted with decision-making
and care. Instead, this role may pass to the patient's
other family members. This can be heartbreaking
for the couple. One husband, eventually forced into
a "Medicaid divorce," recounts comforting his wife
with brain injury:
I hold her, tell her I love her, and tell her I'm going to
find whatever help there is out there and I'll never
abandon her. Because I took our marriage vows
very seriously ... I won't abandonyou. I say, the last
breath I take will be taking care ofyou. 96

This is in stark contrast with the policies of other
developed countries, which provide universal
health insurance with negligible out-of-pocket
costs. In Canada, for instance, patients without private insurance who have sustained a traumatic
brain injury enjoy free access to inpatient acute care
and rehabilitation. However, care, largely financed
by tax revenues from individual provinces, may
entail some disparities for residents from different
localities.97 Significantly, the financing of health
care in Canada does not require families to dissolve
in order to receive care for significant disabilities
such as severe brain injury.
272
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In addition to the right to marry, persons with
severe brain injury have the right to continuing
contact and a relationship with their children. The
CRPD recognizes this right and sets out that "[i]
n no case shall a child be separated from parents
on the basis of a disability."9 However, in cases of
separation or divorce, a person with severe brain
injury may be completely cut off from any children.
A woman whose adult daughter suffers from a
DOC recounts the family's legal struggles to ensure
contact between her daughter and her minor children, who are in the custody of an ex-spouse who
refuses to allow them to see their mother because
she has a DOC. She highlights that this contact
with her children may be important not only to the
children's well-being but also to her daughter's cognitive recovery.9 9 To comply with the CRPD, states
must "ensure that a child shall not be separated
from his or her parents against their will, except
when competent authorities subject to judicial review determine, in accordance with applicable law
and procedures, that such separation is necessary
for the best interests of the child."

Right to equality
Equality is a core human rights principle that is
often violated with respect to persons with severe
brain injury, such as when they are legally denied
the right to make their own decisions or not able
to access assistive devices that would aid them in
communicating with others, as discussed earlier.
The first article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims, "All human beings are born
free and equal in dignity and rights."'1 The ICCPR
and Universal Declaration of Human Rights further establish that all persons "are equal before the
law and are entitled without any discrimination
to equal protection of the law," which the CRPD
echoes.102 The equality enshrined in these international instruments is substantive rather than a
formal requirement of identical treatment. 03 In fact,
as the UN Human Rights Committee has recognized, equality may necessitate "affirmative action
in order to diminish or eliminate conditions which
cause or help to perpetuate discrimination."104
In this vein, the CRPD states that "[i]n order to
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promote equality and eliminate discrimination,"
states should "take all appropriate steps to ensure
that reasonable accommodation is provided."105
Moreover, "[s]pecific measures which are necessary to accelerate or achieve de facto equality of
persons with disabilities shall not be considered
6
discrimination."10
Closely linked to equality is fundamental
dignity and "the right to recognition everywhere
as a person before the law" under the various international instruments. 1 7 As the Committee on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has clarified,
this includes the enjoyment of "legal capacity on an
equal basis with others," integral to "the capacity
to be both a holder of rights and an actor under the
law."10 8 Instead of substituting for the decisions of
persons with disability, the state has the responsibility to provide the support needed for the exercise
of legal capacity.109 Moreover, a "person's mode of
communication must not be a barrier to obtain
support in decision-making, even where this communication is non-conventional, or understood by
very few people.""° However, as the committee has
explained:
Support in decision-making must not be used as
justificationfor limiting otherfundamental rights of
persons with disabilities,especially the right to vote,
the right to marry, or establish a civil partnership,
and found a family, reproductive rights, parental
rights, the right to give consent for intimate
relationships and medical treatment, and the right
to liberty."'

While US federal disability law (the Americans
with Disabilities Act) is also meant to ensure
equality and non-discrimination in employment
and places of public accommodation, this law may
have limited effect in assuring equality for persons
with severe brain injury if actors such as health
care providers do not recognize their legal duty to
accommodate persons with disabilities, there is a
lack of understanding about what constitutes proper accommodations, or persons with disabilities do
not have the legal resources to assert their rights.112
Significantly, many US states undermine the legal
capacity and fundamental rights of persons with
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cognitive disabilities. While some states' laws allow
for supported decision-making for a person with a
cognitive impairment such as severe brain injury,
where a person with a cognitive disability retains
legal capacity while also receiving assistance in
making decisions on the basis of their preferences and interests, most state laws necessitate the
complete transfer of decision-making authority to
surrogates or a guardian.113 This often negatively
affects other important rights, such as the right to
benefit from scientific progress. For instance, laws
that deny persons under guardianship the right to
participate in clinical research may also mean that
persons with severe brain injury under guardianship do not have access to cutting-edge therapies
being studied in clinical trials.114 Laws that deny
legal recognition and capacity thus violate the fundamental equality and basic rights of persons with
severe brain injury, requiring amendment.

A path forward
The current lack of access to treatment and rehabilitation for persons with severe brain injury violates
their fundamental rights to human dignity, life,
health, benefit from scientific progress, education,
freedom of expression, community, marriage and
family, and equality. Compliance with international human rights law requires the following:
e

data collection on persons with severe brain

injury
.

improved diagnosis

.

an end to unnecessary institutionalization in
long-term care facilities

.

access to rehabilitation and communication
technologies, covered by health insurance

.

access to a community of peers

.

support for families to stay together

While full achievement of economic and social
rights is subject to resource constraints, these
rights bring certain immediate obligations, and
governments must take steps for their progressive
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realization "to the maximum of available resources.""' The right to health contains a minimum core,
immediately binding, which includes non-discriminatory access to health care and the equitable
distribution of health facilities, goods, and services."6 The UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of
persons with disabilities provides specific guidance
on resource implications. She explains that "obligations of immediate effect," even if resources are
scarce, include "the elimination of discrimination
in the exercise of this right, ... securing access to
social protection and ensuring a minimum essential level of benefits for all persons with disabilities
and their families."7 It is important to recognize
that that some technologies and rehabilitation
treatments for persons with severe brain injury may
be costly. Such interventions need not be provided
all at once, but governments must take steps toward
their provision to satisfy their obligations.
The minimum core of the right to health requires the adoption of national health strategies and
plans of actions with benchmarks to measure progressive realization. These national strategies and
plans must further give particular attention to vulnerable and marginalized groups, such as persons
with severe brain injury.` Currently, with a 41%
misdiagnosis rate, persons with severe brain injury
do not receive a basic standard of care available to
others. Indeed, many are not even receiving basic
medical care or treatment at all.119 Thus, national
health strategies and plans must address this gap to
protect basic rights. As the UN Special Rapporteur
on the rights of persons with disabilities notes, "[t]
o guarantee progressive realization of the right to
social protection, States should formulate strategies
and plans that include realistic, achievable and
measurable indicators and time-bound targets, designed to assess progress in its implementation.""'
Accordingly, states at the very least must
eliminate discrimination in care and create strategies and action plans to meet the needs of persons
with severe brain injury. Now that we understand
the gravity of this situation and the vulnerability of
individuals with severe brain injury and DOCs, we
are ethically and legally obliged to act and advocate
to address current neglect.
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